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Abstract—A correction to the specification of the mechanism
proposed in [1] is given.
Index Terms— Budget balance, game form/mechanism, indi-
vidual rationality, Nash implementation, Unicast service provi-
sioning.
The mechanism presented in [1] has a tax function which is
not differentiable with respect to the allocations. We need a tax
function which is differentiable with respect to the allocations
so that we can have Nash implementation. We correct it as
follows.
We consider the problem formulated in [1]. We use the same
notation as in [1].
Specification of the game form/mechanism:
Message space: The message space is the same as that of the
mechanism presented in [1]. A message of user i ∈ N (N
denotes the set of users) is of the form
mi = (xi, p
li1
i , p
li2
i , · · · , p
li|Ri|
i ),
where xi denotes the (non-negative) bandwidth user i requests
at all the links of his route, and pliki ≥ 0 denotes the price
user i is willing to pay per unit of bandwidth at link ljk of
his route Ri.
Outcome function: For any m ∈ M, the outcome function is
defined as follows:
f(m) = (x1, x2, · · · , xn, t1, t2, · · · , tn)
ti =
∑
l∈Ri
tli,
where tli is the tax paid by user i for using link l. The form
of tli is the same as the tax function defined in [1] excluding
the term that is of the form described by relation (23) in [1].
For example, if |Gl| > 3, (Gl denotes the set of users using
link l) the tax function in Eq. (13) of [1] now becomes,
tli = P
l
−ixi + (p
l
i − P
l
−i − ζ
l
+)
2
− 2P l−i
(
pli − P
l
−i
)(E l−i + xi
γ
)
+Φli, (1)
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where
ζl+ = max{0,
∑
i∈Gl xi − c
l
γˆ
}, (2)
cl is the capacity of link l, Φli is defined by Eq. (14) in [1],
P l−i =
∑
j∈Gl
j 6=i
plj
|Gl| − 1
, E l−i =
∑
j∈Gl
j 6=i
xj − c
l, (3)
(P l−i and E l−i are the same as in [1]) and γ, γˆ, are positive
constants.
This completes the specification of the mechanism.
Based on the above specification, the proof of Lemma 2 in
[1] is updated as follows.
Proof of Lemma 2 in [1]: Let m∗ = (m∗i ,m∗−i) be a
NE of the game induced by the mechanism. Since user i does
not control Φli, it implies
∂Φl
i
∂pl
i
= 0, (as in Eq. (34) of [1]). By
following the same steps as in equations (35-38) of [1], we
obtain for any l ∈ L:
∂tli
∂pli
∣∣
m=m∗
= 2
[
(p∗li − P
∗l
−i − ζ
∗l
+ )− P−i
(
E∗l−i + x
∗
i
γ
)]
= 0.
(4)
Summing (4) over all i ∈ Gl, we get
∑
i∈Gl
∂tli
∂pli
∣∣
m=m∗
=
∑
i∈Gl
[
(p∗li − P
∗l
−i − ζ
∗l
+ )− P−i
(
E∗l−i + x
∗
i
γ
)]
= −|Gl|ζ∗l+ −
∑
i∈Gl
P ∗l−i
(
E∗l−i + x
∗
i
γ
)
= 0. (5)
Suppose
∑
i∈Gl x
∗
i > c
l
. Then we must have, ζ∗l+ > 0
and
∑
i∈Gl P
∗l
−i
(
E∗l−i+x
∗
i
γ
)
≥ 0. But this contradicts Eq. (5).
Therefore, we must have∑
i∈Gl
x∗i ≤ c
l. (6)
This implies,
ζ∗l+ = 0. (7)
2Combining (7) along with (5) we obtain
∑
i∈Gl
P ∗l−i
(
E∗l−i + x
∗
i
γ
)
= 0. (8)
Moreover, combining (6) and (8) we obtain
P ∗l−i
(
E∗l−i + x
∗
i
γ
)
= 0. (9)
for every i ∈ Gl. Using (7) and (9) in (4) we obtain
p∗li = P
∗l
−i. (10)
Since (10) is true for all i ∈ Gl, it implies,
p∗li = p
∗l
j = P
∗l
−i =: p
∗l, (11)
and along with (9) it implies
p∗lE∗l = 0, (12)
where E∗l =
∑
i∈Gl x
∗
i − c
l (E∗l is the same as in [1]).
Furthermore, since
∂Φli
∂xi
= 0 (13)
(Eq. (34) in [1])), it follows from (1) that
∂tli
∂xi
∣∣
m=m∗
= p∗l. (14)
because of (7), (11), (12), and (13).
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 5 follows when x∗i > 0.
Note that, when x∗i = 0, since user i does not have incentive
to increase its demand, it follows that
∂Ui(xi)
∂xi
−
∑
l∈Ri
p∗l
∣∣
m=m∗
≤ 0. (15)
Now, set λ∗l = p∗l. Then (12) and (15) are consistent with
the KKT conditions (68-70) of [1].
I. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
Existence of Nash equilibria (NE): The proof of existence
of NE of the game induced by the mechanism is the same as
in [1] (see Theorem 6, page 398, and its proof in [1]; also see
the proof of Theorem 7).
Feasibility of allocations at NE: Because of the specification
of the mechanism and Eq. (7), the allocations corresponding
to all NE are in the feasible set.
Budget Balance at any feasible allocation: Budget balance
at any feasible allocation follows by Lemma 3 of [1].
Individual Rationality: Individual rationality follows by The-
orem 4 of [1].
Nash implementation: Nash implementation follows by The-
orem 5 of [1].
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